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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order establishing the value of the primary asset of the estate, 
the life estate interest held by the decedent before his death. The underlying dispute involves a 
creditor's claim filed by the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the 
"Department") for Medicaid estate recovery as provided in Idaho Code § 56-218. Medicaid 
estate recovery is a program required by federal Medicaid law that seeks to recover assets of 
deceased Medicaid recipients in order to reimburse the taxpayers for expenditures made during 
the Medicaid recipient's life. The Department's claim involves the value of a life estate which 
the Medicaid recipient had retained upon executing a Gift Deed to his daughter, Cathie Peterson 
("Peterson"). 
Course of Proceedings 
A detailed description of the course of proceedings is found in the Department's 
Respondent's Briefbefore the District Court. R. Vol. III, pp. 484 to 489. However, the 
proceedings most relevant to this appeal include the following: 
Peterson was appointed personal representative in this matter July 26, 2007. The 
Department filed a timely Claim Against Estate and later an Amended Claim Against Estate in 
the amount of$171,386.94. The personal representative disallowed the claims without stating a 
reason. In response, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim on 
December 28,2007. After a hearing on March 25,2008, the court entered its Order Granting 
Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim. 
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On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, setting 
forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life estate. The personal 
representative then filed her Objection to Petition to Require Payment of Claim, stating its 
position relating to the life estate. After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order on Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim" on June 12, 2008. This order established the life estate as an asset of 
the estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to add the 
life estate interest to the Inventory and assign it an appropriate value. 
On July 15,2009, the Department filed its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and 
Payment to Department." After a hearing on July 28,2009, the court entered its "Order Granting 
Petition to Compel" on August 11, 2009. The personal representative appealed from this order to 
the District Court. A "Decision on Appeal" was issued by the District Court on May 25,2010. 
Contrary to Peterson's contention on p. 2 of Appellant's Brief, the District Court did not reverse 
the Magistrate, but rather, vacated the Order and remanded "so that findings of facts and 
conclusions oflaw can be established." R. Vol. II, p. 218. 
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27,2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an 
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21,2010 to determine all remaining factual issues. 
On September 17,2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for Notice and 
Special Appearance" on behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually." Five days later, the 
Department filed its "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause." The 
Department's petition for removal was heard on October 7,2010. On the same day, the court 
entered its "Order Removing Personal Representative." 
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Peterson, through attorney John Finney, appealed her removal as personal representative. 
The District Court entered its Order, affIrming the removal, on May 11,2011. This Order was 
not appealed further. 
Trial on the remaining issues was held on September 29, 2011. At that trial, Cathie 
Peterson was represented by Attorney Brent Featherston. Attorney John Finney also participated, 
but not as counsel for Cathie Peterson. Tr. (Sept. 29, 2011) p. 1,1. 24 to p. 5, 1. 14. The court 
issued its Memorandum Decision on December 22,2011 (R. Vol. Ill, p. 424), and its Order re: 
Value of Estate Interest (R. Vol. III, p. 452) on January 10, 2012. Cathie Peterson then appealed 
to the District Court which entered its Opinion and Order on Appeal of Magistrate Court's 
Ruling re Medicaid Claim (R. Vol. Ill, p. 529) affIrming the Magistrate on November 16,2012. 
This appeal followed. 
Statement ofthe Facts 
Both the Magistrate and the District Court found the relevant facts were not in dispute. 
R. Vol. Ill, pp. 425 and 530. As stated by the District Court: Melvin Peterson ('Melvin') was 
born on nd died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. Prior to his death, Melvin 
was the owner of residential real property located in Boundary County. On December 6,2001, 
Melvin executed a Gift Deed1 of his real property to his daughter, Cathie Peterson, retaining for 
himself a life estate in the property. Shortly thereafter, Melvin applied for Medicaid and began 
receiving Medicaid benefIts in March 2003. At the time of his death, Melvin had received a total 
of$171,386.94 in Medicaid benefIts. R. Vol. Ill, p. 530. 
1 R. Vol. I, p. 58, Vol. II, pp. 231 and 357. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Peterson can challenge the Magistrate's Order on Petition to Require 
Payment of Claim (06/12/2008) in this appeal. 
2. Whether the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-117. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the Supreme Court directly reviews the district court's decision. In re Doe, 
147 Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.3d 974,979 (2009). However, to determine whether the district court 
erred in affirming the magistrate court, independent review of the record before the magistrate 
court is necessary. Id. The Court reviews questions of law de novo. Martin v. Camas Cnty. ex 
reI. Bd. ofComm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 511, 248 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2011). The interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law. State Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 102, 
90 P.3d 321,325 (2004). 
II. 
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT SHOULD BE LIMITED 
TO THE VALUATION OF THE ESTATE'S INTEREST IN 
THE REAL PROPERTY. 
A. Peterson Is, and Has Been since Her Appointment as Personal Representative, Subiect to 
the Jurisdiction of the Court. 
Throughout the proceedings involving this estate, Peterson has attempted to claim that the 
court lacks authority to impose orders that affect her personally.2 She persists in that claim here, 
contending the court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. However, 
when Peterson filed her Application for Informal Probate and Appointment of a Personal 
2For example, at one point she contended that the Department, then merely a claimant, had failed to serve her 
with process, evoking a reminder from the court that she, as personal representative, would be the one with the duty to 
serve process on herself. See generally Tr. (Oct. 7, 2010) pp. 20 to 24 (Specifically, Tr. (Oct. 7,2010), p. 20, 1. 16 to p. 
21,1. 2, and p. 22, 11. 9-14; p. 23, ll. 4-12.) 
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Representative (R. Vol. I, p. 12) she specifically invoked the jurisdiction of the court to 
detennine issues related to the property of the estate, including estate property held by her. Idaho 
Code § 15-3-602. When she was removed as personal representative, the court specifically 
retained jurisdiction over her. See page 2, paragraph 3 of the Order Removing Personal 
Representative (R. Vol. II, p. 265). 
Additionally, probate cases are in the nature of proceedings in rem and the court's orders 
apply to all who are given notice. As stated in Connolly v. Probate Court in and for Kootenai 
County, 25 Idaho 35, l36 P. 205 (19l3): 
The Supreme Court of California in that case, after stating that the proceeding for 
the distribution of an estate is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which is in the 
hands of an administrator or executor for distribution, says: "By giving the notice 
directed by the statute, the entire world is called before the court, and the court 
acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of detennining their rights to 
any portion of the estate; and every person who may assert any right or interest 
therein is required to present his claim to the court for its detennination. ***" 
Connolly, 25 Idaho at _, l36 P. at _ (quoting William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 
Pac. 323 (1897)). Notice requirements for probate proceedings are set forth in Idaho Code § 15-
1-401. There is no question that Peterson had notice of all proceedings in this matter since she 
was either the appointed personal representative, or otherwise participated in them. Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-106 states: 
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and 
jurisdiction of persons, the court may herein detennine any other controversy 
concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative, 
may be a party. Persons notified are bound though less than all interested persons 
may have been given notice. 
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Idaho Code § 15-3-106 (underline added). Peterson is and has been subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court and is bound by all of the orders issued by the court since her appointment in August, 2007. 
B. The Magistrate's June 12,2008, Order Should Not Be Subject to Challenge in this Third 
Appeal. 
1) The June 12, 2008 Order was an appealable order that was not appealed within 42 
days. 
Peterson's issues A, B, and C on appeal challenge the Magistrate's June 12,2008, Order 
on Petition to Require Payment of Claim (R. Vol. I, p. 79) in which the Magistrate held that the 
life estate retained by the decedent is an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid estate 
recovery. This was an appealable order. 
Except for supervised estates, probate is not one continuous matter. Idaho Code § 15-3-
107. Rather, each proceeding is considered independent of any other. Id. Idaho Code § 17-201 
defines which probate orders are appealable: 
17-201. Appealable judgments and orders. - An appeal may be taken to 
the district court of the county from ajudgment, or order of the magistrates 
division of the district court in probate matters: 
* * * 
4. Against or in favor of setting apart property, or making an allowance 
for a widow or child. 
5. Against or in favor of directing the partition, lease, mortgage, sale or 
conveyance of real property. 
* * * 
7. Refusing, allowing or directing the distribution or partition of an estate .. 
or any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share. 
* * * 
Idaho Code § 17-201. 
The June 12,2008, Order made two important decisions that were appealable within 42 
days after the entry of the order: First, the order required the payment ofthe Department's claim. 
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This was appealable under subsection (7). Second, the order set aside the life estate interest as an 
asset of the estate for purposes of estate recovery and the payment of the Department's claim. 
This effectively directed the real property to be partitioned for purposes of payment of the 
Department's claim. This was appealable under subsection (4), (5), and (7). The personal 
representative, however, did not appeal. 
When appealable orders are not appealed within the time permitted, they become final 
and are no longer subject to challenge. In re Lundy'S Estate, 79 Idaho 185, 190,312 P.2d 1028, 
1030-1 (1957). The case of Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409 (1934) is not unlike 
this case. It involved a petition for specific performance of a contract to make a gift. The 
probate court entered an order requiring the administrator to convey a two-thirds interest in real 
property to the petitioner. The order was reversed by the District Court. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the petitioner contended the probate court order was not appealable. The 
Supreme Court disagreed: 
The contention is without merit. Where, as in this case, the probate court 
decrees specific performance of a contract, one objecting to the petition has no 
remedy except by appeal, and his right to do so is granted by 1. C. A. § 11-401, 
which provides: 
"An appeal may be taken to the district court of the county from a 
judgment, or order of the probate court in probate matters: *** 
5. Against or in favor of directing the * * * conveyance of real 
property." 
Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho at _,34 P.2d at 410 (deletions in original, citations omitted). 
Much like the appealable order in Wilson, the effect of the June 12,2008 Order in this case was 
to establish an interest in Peterson's real property in the estate and to required her to use that 
interest to pay the Department's claim. 
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In another similar case, an unpublished, decision from the state of Montana, the court 
found an order requiring payment in compensation for a life estate interest in real property to be 
an appealable order. In the case of Estate of Burton, 352 Mont. 550, 218 P.3d 497 (2009 WL 
2217535) (2009) (R. Vol. I, p. 165) the decedent's will left a life estate in certain real property to 
his domestic partner, Vanek. The decedent's ex-wife and business partner, Geshell, was 
appointed personal representative. The probate court held that the interest granted to Vanek had 
become a financial interest and upon a petition for allowance, on September 30, 2005, ordered 
Geshell to pay $129,679 to Vanek in compensation for the life estate interest. More than a year 
later, the personal representative, Geshell, appealed a number of other issues in the probate case 
and also attempted to appeal the September 30, 2005, order. The Montana Supreme Court, 
however, held that the September 30,2005, order was an appealable order, and the personal 
representative having failed to appeal that order, the issues were waived: 
Geshell's appeal of the September 30,2005 order to pay Vanek $129,679 
for the life estate is untimely under M.R.App. P. 1 (2005). A party in a civil case 
may appeal from a judgment or order "refusing, allowing, directing the 
distribution or partition of any estate, or any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, 
claim, legacy, or distributive share .... " M.R.App. P. 1 (b)(3) (2005). M.R.App. P. 
5(a)(I) (2005) requires that a civil appeal be filed within 30 days from entry of 
judgment. Geshell failed to appeal the September 30, 2005 order within 30 days 
of Vanek filing her entry of judgment on October 18,2005. Thus, we conclude 
that Geshell waived her right to appeal the District Court's decision to grant 
Vanek $129,679 as her financial interest in lieu of the life estate. 
Estate of Burton, slip op. at 2 (R. Vol. I, p. 166). 
In this case, the June 12,2008 Order was an appealable order. Having failed to appeal 
that order, the question of whether the life estate is an asset subject to Medicaid estate recovery 
has been waived and is no longer subject to appeal. 
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2) Even ifit was an interlocutory order, it was a necessary part of the removal 
proceeding that was not appealed beyond the District Court. 
This is Peterson's third appeal. Her first appeal challenged the Magistrate's August 11, 
2009 Order compelling the sale of the real property to pay the Department's claim. (R. Vol. I, p. 
114). In that matter, Judge Verby felt that the June 12,2008 Order was interlocutory and 
therefore could be challenged under the doctrine stated in Matter 0/ the Estate of Spencer, 106 
Idaho 316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984). R. Vol. II, pp. 215-216. However, Judge Verby felt he 
was unable to reach a decision on the merits because of a lack of sufficient findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw and remanded the matter for appropriate findings. R. Vol. II, pp. 216-217. 
In Peterson's second appeal she challenged her removal as personal representative. R. 
Vol. II, p. 274. Every part of the litigation in this estate has revolved around the Department's 
claim to the life estate and the court's June 12,2008 Order fmding the life estate interest to be an 
asset of the estate. A central part of the grounds for removing Peterson as personal representative 
was her repeated and continued failure to give an appropriate value to the life estate as required 
by the June 12, 2008 Order. Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim, p. 2 (R. Vol. I, p. 
80). Instead, even after the court found the life estate to have value and required her to assign it 
an appropriate value, she assigned a value of$O. R. Vol. II, p. 220. The Magistrate found, as 
part of the grounds for her removal, that she had "flaunted" the June 12,2008 Order. Tr. (Oct. 7, 
2010) p. 34,11. 9-19. Her failure to comply with this order was also argued in the briefing. See 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 25-26 (R. Vol. I, pp. 145-148). Therefore, had Peterson desired to 
challenge the June 12,2008, Order, she should have done so no later than in the second appeal 
where it was directly in issue. Nothing in the Estate a/Spencer case suggests the ability to 
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challenge interlocutory orders goes on indefinitely. If the Magistrate's June 12,2008 Order, 
holding that the life estate was an asset of the estate, was legally wrong, the Department would 
have had no standing to seek Peterson's removal. Her failure to appeal the District Court's order 
affirming her removal effectively waived any further challenge on that issue. 
III. 
THE LIFE ESTATE IS AN ASSET SUBJECT TO ESTATE 
RECOVERY 
If the Court finds that Peterson's challenge to the Magistrate's June 12,2008 Order has 
not been waived, the Magistrate was correct and Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) applies to make the 
life estate an asset subject to Medicaid estate recovery. 
A. Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) Makes Retained Life Estates Subject to Medicaid Estate 
Recovery. 
As the Court is aware, in 1993, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, commonly referred to as OBRA '93. This act, codified primarily in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, 
provided, among other things, for an expanded definition of estate. Idaho adopted the expanded 
definition of estate effective July 1, 1995. It is found in Idaho Code § 56-218(4): 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. 3 
3This language is taken word for word from 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)( 4)(B). 
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Idaho Code § 56-218(4) (emphasis added). Therefore, for purposes of estate recovery, the estate 
subject to the Department's claim includes a retained life estate held by a Medicaid recipient or 
his spouse at time of death. 
As Peterson points out, this is a departure from the common law treatment of life estates. 
At common law, a life estate terminated and the interest passed to the remainderman upon the 
death of the holder. Where, as here, the life estate passes an interest in property to a survivor or 
heir, Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) abrogates common law to the extent necessary to preserve the 
life estate interest for estate recovery. Oregon has an estate recovery law very similar to Idaho's. 
Oregon has also adopted the expanded definition of estate. In the case of State Dept. of Human 
Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 (2006), Oregon brought an action to 
recover the value of a life estate of a deceased Medicaid recipient where, like here, the property 
had been conveyed to the child of the Medicaid recipient, retaining a life estate. In the 
Willingham case, however, the life estate had been created in 1993 before the 1995 adoption of 
the expanded definition of estate. The Medicaid payments had been made after the adoption of 
the new law. Therefore, the primary issue was whether the 1995 law would be applied to the 
1993 life estate.4 The Oregon Court of Appeals examined the legal effect of the expanded 
definition of estate and its application to life estates and concluded that the law abrogated the 
common law, and the life estate interest was preserved after death for purposes of estate 
recovery: 
Based on that change in the law in 1995, we agree with the state that the legal 
effect of the legislature'S amendment was to modifY the common law rule that a 
4This issue is not present here. The life estate in this case was created December 6, 2001, well after the July 1, 
1995, effective date ofIdaho's law. 
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life estate interest is extinguished under the circumstances established by the 
statute. For purposes of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during 
the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest, the life estate continues to exist 
after the death of the person holding the interest. 
Willingham, 206 Or.App. at 160, 136 P.3d at 68 (underline added); see also Bonta v. Burke, 98 
Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 (2002) (where the Medicaid recipient mother had retained a 
life estate and a right to revoke the remainder, the life estate was not extinguished on her death, 
but rather was an asset of the estate for purposes of estate recovery); In re Estate of Laughead, 
696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was 
required to be included in the estate for purposes of estate recovery). 
All of these cases consistently construe the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) 
which was adopted by each state, including Idaho. 
B. The Value of the Life Estate Is Determined at the Moment Before Death. 
Peterson claims the life estate has no value because it is extinguished at death. However, 
as shown by the cases cited above, the value of the life estate is determined the moment before 
death, not after. This issue was specifically addressed in the case of In re Estate of Laughead, 
supra: 
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at 
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In 
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding "the phrase 'at the 
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's 
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of 
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real 
property within the meaning of section 249 A.5(2)( c ). 
In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d at 316. Any other interpretation would make the life 
estate language in Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) a nullity. The court, of course, will not give a 
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statute an interpretation which would render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 
P.3d 116, 121 (App. 2001). The purpose of the expanded definition of estate is met by 
recognizing the value of the property at the moment before the death of the Medicaid recipient. 
Peterson offers a novel interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56-218( 4)(b) in which she says it 
would apply if the decedent had given Peterson his own life estate, i.e., transferred the property 
to her for his life. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. However, that doesn't make any sense because the 
property would then revert to his estate on his death and would be part of the ordinary probate 
estate. If that were the case, Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(a) would apply, and the life estate language 
in subsection (4)(b) would be totally superfluous. Peterson offers no authority for this 
interpretation. 
IV. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
DEPARTMENT'S LIFE ESTATE VALUATION RULES. 
Peterson argues that the life estate tables in Rule 8375 should not be used because the 
tables should be applied only during the lifetime of the Medicaid recipient. Appellant's Brief, p. 
12. However, as stated above, the life estate is valued immediately before death. In re Estate of 
Laughead, supra. Had Melvin Peterson signed a quit-claim deed immediately before his death, 
ceding his life estate interest to Peterson, the tables found in Rule 837 would be applied. It 
makes no sense to say that some other, unnamed, measure should be used because the transfer 
takes place by operation of law rather than by deed. 
5IDAPA 16.03.05.837. 
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Peterson suggests that Rule 837 only applies to transfers made during the look-back 
period, apparently not realizing that both the Gift Deed and Melvin's death took place "during 
the look-back period." The look back "period" is actually a look-back "date" and the rule applies 
to any transfer made after that date. The look back date is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) 
which provides as follows: 
(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is a date that is 
36 months (or, in the case of payments from a trust or portions ofa trust that are 
treated as assets disposed of by the individual pursuant to paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or 
(3)(B)(ii) of subsection (d) of this section or in the case of any other disposal of 
assets made on or after February 8,2006,60 months) before the date specified in 
clause (ii). 
(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to 
(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of which the 
individual both is an institutionalized individual and has applied for 
medical assistance under the State plan, or 
(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which the 
individual applies for medical assistance under the State plan or, iflater, 
the date on which the individual disposes of assets for less than fair market 
value. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B). Since it is undisputed that Melvin began receiving benefits about 
March, 2003, the 2001 Gift Deed and the transfer effected on Melvin's death were both after the 
look-back date. 
Peterson, for her part, has offered no other basis for valuing the life estate, other than to 
again argue that there should be no value at all, in essence inviting the court to ignore section 
218(4)(b) entirely. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. The Magistrate reasonably and correctly applied 
Rule 837. 
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V. 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD JURISDICTION TO 
DETERMINE AND VALUE ESTATE ASSETS. 
Peterson argues that the Magistrate lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the 
estate's interest in the real property. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. She cites In re Lundy's Estate, 79 
Idaho 185, 312 P .2d 1028 (1957) for the proposition that the probate court does not have 
authority to determine title to real property as between the estate or heirs and third parties. 
However, like the appellant in Lundy's Estate, Peterson is not a third party. The dispute in 
Lundy's Estate was between the decedent's surviving wife and his children from a prior 
marriage. The issues that had to be decided included the validity of certain quitclaim deeds and a 
property settlement agreement and whether, in light of those documents, the estate consisted of 
either community or separate property. As to jurisdiction to determine the real property issues, 
the court explained: 
It is the general rule that where title to real property is in issue between an estate 
and its heirs and a third person, such issue must be tried in an independent action 
brought for that purpose in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate 
court. 
However, this is not such a case. Here the issue is between the 
administratrix claiming as sole heir and appellants claiming they are the sole 
heirs. In probate proceedings the probate court is a court of record and has 
'original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased 
persons, and appointment of guardians'. We have held that this probate 
jurisdiction bestowed on the probate court by the constitution is exclusive. 
* * * 
Here no stranger or third party is involved. The issue is drawn between rival 
claimants to heirship. As between such parties the probate court has jurisdiction 
to settle all issues essentially involved in a determination of who are the heirs, and 
the distributive share or shares of each. 
In order to determine whether the property was community or separate and 
thus to determine to whom it should descend it was necessary for the probate 
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court to pass upon the validity of the quitclaim deeds and the property settlement 
agreement. 
'Whether the property was separate property or community property was 
one of the questions to be determined by the probate court and by the parties 
submitted to that court for its decision. That court had authority to determine the 
persons who, by law, were entitled to the property, and also the proportions or 
parts to which each was entitled, who were the heirs of the deceased, and who 
were entitled to succeed to the estate, and their respective shares and interests 
therein.' 
Lundy's Estate, 79 Idaho at 193-4, 312 P.2d at 1032-3 (citations omitted; underline added). Just 
as in Lundy's Estate Peterson is not a stranger or third party; she is the daughter of the decedent 
and an heir of the estate. The question before the probate court was whether the life estate 
interest passed to her on the decedent's death or whether it remained an asset of the estate. 
Having determined that the life estate was an asset of the estate, the probate court was also 
competent to decide its value. While Peterson, who was personal representative for most of the 
time this matter has been pending, likes to portray herself as an outsider and a third party, 
nothing could be further from the truth. 
Idaho Code § 1-2208(2) assigns probate and estate administration cases to the 
magistrates. This is so irrespective of the value of the estate or its assets. Keeven vs. Estate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290,882 P.2d 457 (App. 1994). Idaho Code § 15-3-104 gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to the probate court to determine claims against the decedent and his successors. 
Moreover, the personal representative of an estate has the authority and duty to value the assets 
of the estate. Idaho Code § 15-3-706. The personal representative may petition the court and 
seek orders related to his duties. Idaho Code § 15-3-105. Clearly the court had authority to enter 
an order valuing the life estate as an estate asset. 
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The issue here is not whether the probate court could partition the property to divide 
estate assets from non-estate assets. While Peterson was personal representative, the Department 
sought orders requiring her to liquidate the estate assets, if necessary, to pay the Department's 
claim. Now that the Department is the named personal representative, the Department intends to 
proceed to District Court with a partition action. The Department represented as much to the 
Magistrate who made that part of his order. R. Vol. III, p. 453. So any division of the real 
property will ultimately be done by the District Court. The Magistrate's Order merely 
determined the assets of the estate and the value as between the estate and Peterson, the former 
personal representative and heir. This was clearly with the authority ofthe probate court.6 
VI. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GRANT AN 
OFFSET TO CATHIE PETERSON. 
Peterson complains that "[i]nexplicably, the Trial Court disregarded Cathie's documented 
investment into the property .... " Appellant's Brief, p. 17. However, Judge Julian neither 
disregarded her evidence nor was his ruling inexplicable. To the contrary, Judge Julian found 
that some of the expenditures made were "improvements and not mere maintenance." 
Memorandum Opinion, p. 6. R. Vol. p. 429. He then went on to say: 
However, there is no evidence before the court to demonstrate the enhancement in 
fair market value to the property as a result of said material improvements. The 
court agrees with the State that where equitable contractual relief is sought, the 
proper measure of unjust enrichment is the increase in value to the asset 
6A personal representative has the authority to assign a value to the assets of the estate. Idaho Code § 15-3-706. 
However, Judge Yerby, at the conclusion of oral argument on appeal of the removal of Peterson as personal 
representative, expressed concern that Peterson be given an opportunity to assert her interests in the real property (see R. 
Vol. III, p. 504), and Judge Julian wished to assure the Second District's Grothe decisions were in the record to support 
his fmdings and conclusions. For these reasons, the Department proceeded with its Petition for Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. See R. Vol. III, pp. 425-6. 
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improved, and not the amount expended. Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 
P.2d 196 (1974). 
In her Responsive Brief, Ms. Peterson argues that she should be given a 
dollar for dollar credit, but fails to quantify the total dollar amount she seeks. No 
expert witness testimony was offered at hearing regarding the resulting 
enhancement in value to the house. Nor did Cathie Peterson, as owner of the 
property, offer the court her opinion ofthe property's enhancement in value as a 
result of her improvements and expenditures. Having failed to supply the court 
with sufficient evidence to quantify her claim to enhanced value, the court must 
decline Ms. Peterson's request for a credit offset. 
This holding is well supported in the record. At the hearing of this matter, Cathie 
Peterson testified of the expenses she incurred while maintaining the real property. She also 
testified that she had never paid rent for her occupying the real property, including during the 
time that the decedent was the life tenant. She testified that the decedent went into the nursing 
home shortly after the gift deed was executed in 2001. Therefore, she occupied the home alone 
until his death in 2007.7 It is understandable that she would at least maintain the property. 
Peterson contends that in the ten years between receiving the Gift Deed and the hearing 
she "invested" over $7,000 into improvements "in the belief that she owned the property from 
the time of the deed in December, 2001." Appellant's Brief, p. 16. However that purported 
belief is not in the record and such a belief would be unjustifiable, since she was gifted only the 
remainder interest and Melvin was still alive. Moreover, there was no attempt to quantify what 
7Judge Julian found the Department's comments regarding the non-payment of rent "unpersuasive, as it ignores 
the fact that Cathie is the owner of the property and has the legal right to live there 'rent free'." R. Vol. Ill, p. 428. The 
Department respectfully disagrees. Peterson was not the "owner of the property." During his life, Melvin owned the 
possessory interest and the right to rents and profits. As stated in AmJur Life § 147 (Thomson Reuters, 2011): 
The rents received from real estate during the existence of a life estate belong to a legal life 
tenant or constitute income to which an equitable life beneficiary of a trust is entitled. The rents from 
real property are the very interest which a life tenant acquires in the property, and in them a 
remainderman has no interest during the existence or duration of the life tenancy. 
(underline added). 
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was an improvement as opposed to what was maintenance. For example, Peterson testified the 
windows were cracked, so she put in new ones. Tr. (Sept. 29, 2011) p. 21, 11. 11-15. The floor 
was rotten so she had supports made for that. Tr. (Sept. 29, 2011) p. 22, 1. 25 to p. 23,1. 6. The 
garage roof was repaired because it leaked. Tr. (Sept. 29, 2011) p. 23, 11. 20-1. Since Peterson 
was living in Melvin's house, rent free, while Melvin was in the nursing home (Tr. (Sept. 29, 
2011) p. 37,11. 12-16), it can be expected she would perform the necessary maintenance. 
To the extent that Peterson sought an offset for improvements to the property, it was 
incumbent on her to show that the improvements actually enhanced the value of the property. 
See e.g. Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974) (measure of damages under the 
equitable doctrine of quasi-contract was not the value of the money and materials supplied, but 
the increased value of the property due to the contribution). When directly asked if the work she 
testified to increased the value of the property she was unable to say it did or to quantify it: 
Q: Do you know whether, uh, whether any of the maintenance you did 
to the house, somehow, increased it's value? 
A: Very hard to say. I don't know. 
Tr. (Sept. 29, 2011) p. 38,11. 7-9. 8 The Magistrate's denial of an offset is well supported in fact 
and law. 
8There was no offer or request to supplement this record. This may be because the appraisal done in 2008 and 
later updated (R. Vol. I, pp. 85-106) (which was not offered into evidence) would have negated any claim in an increased 
value resulting from the expenditures on the property: 
This appraiser is aware that there have been some monies spent on the property between those two 
dates (03/03/2007 and 10/30/2008). It is my estimation that these monies spent on the subject property 
are predominantly those that amount to maintenance, and not new major capital improvements such as 
a new bedroom, totally remodeled kitchen, a new bathroom, new garage, etc. Due to the fact that these 
items are generally maintenance and replacement items, possibly extending the physical life but not 
the economic life. 
(sic) No upward adjustment for these items is taken. It is pointed out the (sic) even if these items were 
for smaller capital improvements, there is insufficient market data to measure any value difference 
based on those improvements. 
Addendum, R Vol. I, p. 106. (Changed to upper and lower-case to improve readability). 
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VII. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state 
agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on 
appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Peterson's appeal meets the requirements for this 
section. Peterson has offered no authority and no reasonable argument that the life estate is not 
an asset of the estate. Similarly, she has offered no theory oflaw or other authority to support her 
claim that she should be given an offset for expenditures on her home without showing any 
increase in value of the home. Finally, she continues to challenge the application of the 
Department's life estate tables without offering any alternative method of valuation. Instead, she 
continues to claim the life estate can have no value, which issue was decided against her in June 
of2008. Peterson's appeal is without any reasonable basis in fact or law and attorney fees should 
be awarded to the Department. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Peterson has not shown any error below. The decision below should be affirmed so that 
the Department can proceed with a partition action in the District Court. 
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